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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1.

Did the Court of Appeals err in finding no genuine issue of material fact whether Respondent

"actively participated" in the rigging of a load of roof trusses which fell on Petitioner?
OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The opinion below is Magana v. Dave Roth Construction, 2008 UT App. 240(unpublished).
A copy is attached as Addendum A.
JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT
The Utah Court of Appeals entered its decision on June 26,2008. A petition for certiorariwas
filed July 28, 2008. This Court granted certiorari on October 8, 2008, pursuant to its jurisdiction to
review the appeals court decision pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 45.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Nature of the Case
Appellants Celso and Yolanda Magana ("Magana") seek recovery for injuries causing

paraplegia resulting from a construction site accident. Magana was an employee of Circle T
Construction ("Circle T"), a framing subcontractor for Respondent Dave Roth Construction ("DRC"),
the general contractor.
2.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court Below
Magana brought suit against the general contractor, DRC, and the crane company (ABM Crane).

He settled with ABM Crane, and DRC later moved for summary judgment, which was granted,
resolving the final claims against the remaining party, DRC. Magana appealed the judgment, arguing
that there were material issues of fact regarding whether DRC "actively participated" in the rigging and
lifting of the load of trusses with a crane. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed, and Magana petitioned
for a Writ of Certiorari, which was granted on the issue of "active participation".
Magana's argued that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of DRC in
the face of evidence that Brett Campbell ("Campbell"), DRC's on-site superintendent, "actively
participated" in rigging the load of trusses that were dropped on Magana, breaking his back and leaving
him a complete paraplegic. The appeals court, reviewing the grant of summary judgment de novo,
1

rejected Magana's argument and held that there was no genuine issue of material fact on the issue of
"active participation".
3.

Statement of Relevant Facts on Review

Factual Statement With Citations to Record
Magana was an ordinary laborer for Circle T (R. 477-478), which was a framing
subcontractor hired to frame a new Weinerschnitzel in Salt Lake County (R. 536). Magana's boss
was Ted Alexander ("Alexander")(Id.). The owner of the store hired DRC to be the general
contractor on the project.(R. 214, Fact 1). Campbell was the supervisor for DRC on the project.(R.
214, Fact 2).DRC was to provide a finished product building for the owner, to secure subcontracts from
subcontractors for the owner, and to purchase building materials for the project. (R. 214, Fact 3). DRC
bids out the subcontracts on a "labor only" basis to "keep[j the markup on the materials in-house". (R.
662, Roth Depo., p. 9,1. 1-2).
DRC solicited bidsfromseveral framing subcontractors, including Circle T, which was awarded
the job. (R. 215, Fact 4). Circle T submitted a bid proposal to DRC to provide "framing labor, including
crane". (R. 730). Circle T's bid for framing labor and crane work was $139500.00. (R. 731). DRC
accepted Circle T's bid for the framing labor and crane work. (R. 731).
On the day before the accident, Campbell was notified that the truss joists would arrive the next
day and would need to be offloaded by a crane. (R. 731). Campbell notified Alexander from Circle T
that his truss joists for the roof would be arriving and advised him to have a crane available for
offloading the joists. (R. 731). Alexander learned that the crane company Circle T normally used would
not be available in the morning of April 29,2004, and asked Campbell if he could contact another crane
company: (R. 731). Alexander (of Circle T) and Campbell (of DRC) jointly "split" the task of getting
a crane on site, and offloading the roof trusses. (R. 733, Fact 30). Before the date of the accident, Circle
T had used its own crane company to perform lifting work. (R. 732, Fact 27).
It was undisputed that ABM Crane did not actually bill for its work, due to Magana's accident.
ABM Crane's owner is Eric Johnson, who stated that if he had billed for ABM's work, he would have
billed DRC, not Circle T. (R. 732-733, Fact 28). He also stated that he did not know if DRC would turn
2

around and bill Circle T for ABM's crane work. Id. However, Dave Roth testified that he would have
asked Circle T to pay the ABM bill. (R. 733, Fact 29). On the other hand, Alexander testified that he
and Brett Campbell agreed to split the cost of the crane. (R. 731, Fact 26, R. 733, Fact 30).
Campbell got his job as construction superintendent at DRC because he observed the lack of
involvement of the prior DRC superintendent. (R. 765, Fact 93). Campbell expected the construction
superintendent to actively watch the performance of the various subcontractors, to make sure that there
was "quality control", as opposed to just inspecting the finished product or project. (R. 765, Fact 94;
R. 615-6, Campbell depo., p. 28- 29). DRC was responsible to get the lumber shipped to the job site.
(R. 765, Fact 95). DRC and Circle T jointly shared the responsibility of placing that lumber. (R. 766,
Fact 96; R. 625, Campbell depo., p. 67). Campbell snapped the lines for the walls, for Circle T to frame.
(R. 766, Fact 97). Alexander and Campbell figured out where to place the walls. (R. 766, Fact 98).
Campbell and Alexander "both came to an agreement" how to unload the walls. (R. 766, Fact 99).
Dave Roth himself ordered the truss joists. (R. 766-767, Fact 100). The truck driver that
delivered the truss joists arrived the night before and was ready to unload at 7:00 a.m. (R. 767, Fact
101). The crane company that Alexander called could not come until noon, so Campbell "took the
responsibility to call ABM Crane Rental". (R. 767, Fact 102). On the morning of the accident,
Campbell showed up 15 minutes early "to walk through and check things out". (R. 767, Fact 103).
Campbell woke up the driver of the truck on which the trusses were shipped. (R. 767, Fact 104).
Campbell got Alexander together to work out the exact place to unload the trusses. (R. 767, Fact 105).
Campbell watched Alexander back the truck up, to the place where he wanted it. (R. 768, Fact 106).
There were no other workers there, at that time, other than the truck driver and Circle T workers, for
Campbell to supervise. (R. 768, Fact 107). The crane arrived, and set up where Alexander told him to
set it up. (R. 768, Fact 108). Alexander, Campbell and the crane operator were basically "all standing
in the vicinity of [the crane]". (R. 769, Fact 109). Alexander talked with Campbell the day before about
where Ted wanted to place the crane. (R. 768, Fact 110).
Both Alexander and Campbell were on the flatbed trailer rigging the truss that fell on
Magana. (R. 760, Fact 77, R. 762, Fact 86). Campbell admitted he and Alexander were on the trailer
3

unloading boxes of "blocking" when the second load fell on Magana. (R. 760, Fact 80, Campbell
depo., p. 122,1. 3-25). Magana saw Alexander and "someone else" at each end of the truss, placing
the straps around the end of the truss. (R. 763, Fact 87, Magana depo., p.50,1. 1-2; p. 51,1. 13-16).
Magana could actually see this "someone else" placing straps around the end of the truss. (R. 709,
Fact 88). Magana testified that the second person, "someone else", who was on the trailer, helped
place straps around the truss joists. (R. 709, Fact 90). Magana clearly identified Campbell as the
second person when shown Campbell's picture. (R. 709, Fact 91).
Campbell looked to see if Magana or anyone else was "under the load". (R. 761, Fact 81).
Campbell saw Brody Tolman and Magana holding the tag lines on the second load, but that he did
not believe anyone was under the load. (R. 761, Fact 82). If Campbell had seen Magana under the
load, he "would have alerted him of the fact that you don't get under loads". (R. 761, Fact 83).
Campbell attributed the falling of the load to using wet straps to hold wet trusses, allowing
for slippage. (R. 769, Fact 112).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should reverse the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals because the Appeals
Court's decision conflicts with clearly established Utah Supreme Court precedent. Utah R. App. P.
46(a)(2). A general contractor who "retains control" over a project, or some aspect of that project, may
be held liable for negligence, as set forth in the Restatement of Torts, 2d, §414 "Negligence in
Exercising Control Retained by Employer" in Thompson v. Jess, 979 P.2d 322 (Utah 1999):
One who entrusts work to an independent contractor, but who retains the control of any
part of the work, is subject to liability for physical harm to others for whose safety the
employer owes a duty to exercise reasonable care, which is caused by his failure to
exercise his control with reasonable care.
An employer who is "actively participating" in the work process of a contractor is liable for
failing to exercise reasonable care. Thompson v. Jess, supra. There was abundant evidence in the record
that DRC, through its construction supervisor, Campbell, "actively participated" in the work of
delivering truss joists to the job site, by arranging the delivery, coordinating contact between Alexander,
the truck driver, and the crane operator; by helping to place the wet straps on the wet load that fell; and
4

failing to exercise his prerogative to halt operations or warn workers who were under the load. DRC
retains liability for the negligence of the crane contractor, ABM Crane Rentals, and for its own "active
participation" in the negligent rigging and handling of the truss joist load that fell on Magana. At a
minimum, a reasonable jury could so conclude. Summary judgment should have been denied by the
trial court, and the Utah Court of Appeals should have reversed the summary judgment..
A reading of the Magana opinion on its face reveals that DRC "actively participated" in the
negligent decision to rig the truss load, and the rigging. The Court of Appeals conceded that "Campbell
may have been on the semi-truck, assisting Ted Alexander with rigging the second load of roof trusses."
Magana, p. 2. More accurately stated, the facts showed that Campbell may have been on the semi-truck,
rigging one end of the load, while Ted Alexander rigged the other, after they both decided to proceed
to rig with wet straps in an incorrect rigging configuration. The Court of Appeals looked away from
Campbell's conduct in rigging and lifting the load, but looked at whether Campbell was giving orders
to Alexander on the other end of the load:. "There is, however, no evidence to indicate that Campbell
exerted control over Alexander, or Circle T, or any part of the offloading that was taking place."
Magana, p. 2.
This approach misconstrued the "retained control" or "active participation" doctrines apparently
because both the general contractor and the subcontractor acted negligently in identical but separate
acts. The general contractor rigged one end of the load, and the subcontractor rigged the other end.
Both acted negligently in deciding to rig the wet load; both acted negligently in the scheme of rigging
the load, and each acted negligently in completing the rigging on their individual end of the load.. The
Court of Appeals only looked at whether the general contractor was specifically telling the
subcontractor how to rig its end of the load. It overlooked the fact that both the general contractor and
the subcontractor negligently decided to rig a wet load.
Further, since Campbell was in charge of safety for the project, and presumably could see what
Alexander was doing on his end of the load (the same thing Campbell was doing), he should have
"exerted control over Alexander . . .". Magana, p. 2. And Campbell failed to exercise the control he
should have by joining in the rigging operation at all. By doing so, he ratified it by his conduct.
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The Utah Supreme Court should prune back the over-reading of Thompson v. Jess that the Utah
Court of Appeals did. Left standing, the Magana opinion creates an illogical situation where a general
contractor may be liable for negligently telling a subcontractor how to perform one half of a job, while
being completely immune from liability for its own negligence in the half of the job which the general
contractor has directly retained and controlled to do itself And while the subcontractor might be liable
for the negligent scheme of rigging, the general contractor would not be, even though it joined in that
negligent scheme.
ARGUMENT
THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO FOLLOW THOMPSON V. JESS BECAUSE
THERE WAS EVIDENCE THAT DRC ACTUALLY PARTICIPATED IN THE
NEGLIGENT RIGGING OF THE SECOND LOAD OF TRUSSES
1. Thompson v. Jess
The Utah Supreme Court in Thompson v. Jess, 979 P.2d 322 (Utah 1999) adopted the
Restatement of Torts, 2d, §414 "Negligence in Exercising Control Retained by Employer". The
Thompson court phrased the question as whether the principal employer "actively participated" in the
project. Id., at^[l 8. "Underthe 'active participation' standard, aprincipal employer is subject to liability
for injuries arising out of its independent contractor's work if the employer is actively involved in, or
asserts control over, the manner of performance of the contracted work." Id., at ^f 19. The Utah Supreme
Court distinguished "active participation" from "passive non-participation" as the two sides of this coin.
Id.
"Underthe 'active participation' standard, aprincipal employer is subject to liability for injuries
arising out of its independent contractor's work if the employer is actively involved in, or asserts
control over, the manner of performance of the contracted work." Id., at f 19. Again, Campbell, who
was jointly responsible for safety on the project, was present at the unloading site, rigging his end of
the load, and assuming the responsibility of safety, including warning workers who might be caught
under the load. This constitutes "active participation" under the standard set by the Utah Supreme
Court. The Thompson court elaborated that active participation includes "either the direct management
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of the means and methods of the independent contractor's activities or the provision of specific
equipment that caused the injury". Id., at |20. Again, DRC provided the "specific equipment that
caused the injury", i.e., the crane, and directly managed the rigging and unloading of the truss joists.
The Thompson court approved comment b to Section 414: "A typical instance in which such
an exertion of control might occur is 'when a principal contractor entrusts a part of the work to
subcontractors, but himself or through a foreman superintends the entire job'." Id., f21. With these
principles in mind, the actions of Campbell and DRC constituted "actively participation" rather than
"passive non-participation".
2. Campbell Helped Rig The Second Load That Slipped And Fell On Magana.
Magana testified that both Campbell and Alexander both actually rigged the second load that
slipped, and fell on him. Facts 85-90. Campbell, of course, testified that he was with Alexander on the
trailer (loaded with trusses) unloading boxes of "blocking" when the second load fell on Magana. Fact
80. Brody Tolman, Magana's co-employee, placed Campbell in the area of the semi. While he was
admittedly on or around the load of trusses, Campbell did not "recall" actually helping rigging, while
Managa said he did.
Magana's testimony was translated into, and from, Spanish by Silvia Schulter. Magana stated
that Alexander and "someone else" placed the straps around the truss joists. Alexander and "someone
else" were at each end of the truss, placing the straps around the end of the truss. Magana could actually
see this "someone else" placing straps around the truss joists. Magana testified at one point that he did
not see the "someone else" placing straps around the truss joists. Later, Magana testified that the second
person, "someone else", who was on the trailer, helped place straps around the truss joists:
Q:

... Is it Celso's testimony that there was a second individual that helped rig the second
load?

A:

Yes.

Celso clearly identified Brett Campbell as the second person when shown his picture:
Q:
A:

Do you believe if you were shown a picture of this individual [that helped Ted], you
could identify him?
Yes.
7

Q:

Okay. I'm sorry I have this only on a computer.

Celso, do you recognize this individual?9
Q
Yes.
A
Who is he?
Q
He
is the one who was helping Ted.
A
He
was
helping Ted on the second load. That is the load that fell on you; is that correct?
Q
Yes.
A
MR. ROBSON: For the record, this video is of Brett Campbell's videotaped deposition; is that
correct, Pete?
MR. BARLOW: Yes.
Celso Magana depo., p. 87,1. 5-22, Fact 91, R. 765.
From Magana's testimony, a jury could conclude that DRC actually participated in the negligent
act, which was the rigging of the load of trusses with wet straps, in an incorrect configuration.
Of course, Campbell testified that he was on the flatbed semi-trailer helping Alexander, but that
he did not recall actually helping rig the loads. At best, this contradiction in testimony creates a disputed
issue of material fact as to whether DRC's own supervisor, Campbell, failed to safely rig the second
load of truss joists, in light of the rain and wetness of the straps and the load. Campbell's active
participation in rigging the second load satisfies alone the active participation test.
3. Campbell And DRC Actively Participated In The Construction Project.
Campbell testified in his deposition that both he and Alexander were BOTH in charge of safety
for the project:
Q:
A:

Safety was yours [Campbell's] and Ted's responsibility on the site?
Correct.

R. 760, Fact 78. Campbell testified that, if he had realized that Celso was under the load, he would have
told him to stay out from under the load. This suggests that Campbell felt that he had the right to control
the conduct of Circle T's employees on the job, if he observed unsafe behavior. Campbell testified that
he got his job because he saw the lack of involvement of DRC's prior superintendent. Campbell
expected a superintendent to actively watch the subcontractors for safety and quality control. The fact
that Campbell understood his job to involve walking the job site to watch for unsafe or improper
activities again suggests his "active participation". Examples include when Campbell discussed with
Circle T where to unload the walls, when Campbell snapped the lines for the walls, for Circle T to

8

follow, when Campbell jointly figured out with Circle T where to place the walls, when he and Ted
Alexander "both came to an agreement" how to unload the walls.
Campbell's "active participation" was further shown when, because Circle T could not come
up with a crane and operator, Campbell assumed that responsibility of locating one. ABM Crane Rental
was hired by Campbell, and would have sent its bill to DRC. Alexander believed the crane and operator
to be a shared responsibility between Circle T and DRC. This is consistent with the overall relationship,
which was that Circle T essentially worked as employees for DRC as the contract was for "framing
labor only", with all materials supplied by DRC, under the general supervision of DRC, through
Campbell. This arrangement actually resembles an employee leasing arrangement, where laborers are
supplied to a business, to work under their supervision. Contrast this to the usual subcontractor who
agrees to provide a finished product, and assumes all responsibility for materials and supplies as well
as labor. This is all further evidence of "active participation" rather than "passive non-participation"
by Campbell and DRC.
Contrast this to a scenario where the supervisor for the general contractor only appears to
inspect the subcontractor's finished product for conformance to the contract, but otherwise is
uninvolved. Had Campbell's involvement been limited to that, then the trial court and the Court of
Appeals would have been correct in dismissing the case. A mere contractual right of safety control
would also have not been sufficient to constitute "active participation". But Campbell's job and his
involvement went far beyond these scenarios. He walked the job daily actively giving directions on the
proper course of construction. He had to, given the "labor-only" nature of the contract. While he gave
the subcontractor lee-way to work without his hovering overhead, he was still very involved and felt
he had the right and duty to give directions to employees on the site, as the need may arise.
4. Comparing Magana with Other Utah Cases:
Magana provides a clear contrast with the facts in Thompson. In Thompson, the landowner, the
contracting party, was not on the location when the negligent conduct and accident occurred. Unlike
DRC, she was not in the business of constructing buildings. She did not enter into a "labor-only"
arrangement, reserving all other elements of control to herself. She did not actively participate in
9

supervising how the work was done, and did not actually participate herself as DRC and Brett
Campbell did here. The contrast in facts between Thompson and this case could not be clearer.
Another recent case from the Utah Court of Appeals is remarkably similar, however. In Local
Gov'tTrustv. Wheeler Machinery, 2006 UTApp 513,154 P.3d 175, a City hired a contractor, Wheeler,
to supply two generators, including the entire exhaust system. Id., |2,154 P.3d at 176. Wheeler in turn
contracted with Richard Carlson, proprietor of Independence Welding ("Carlson") to install 'Various
parts of the exhaust system". Id., \2>. Allegedly, Carlson negligently installed the exhaust, causing a fire
which damaged the City's power plant. Wheeler was sued, but defended based upon Thompson v. Jess,
arguing that it did not retain control of Carlson's work. Id, \9, 154 P.3d at 178. The Court of Appeals
found that it did, and reversed summary judgment in favor of Wheeler. Id., TJ10.
The Wheeler case is similar to this one. There was evidence that it was Wheeler who hired
Carlson, and not the City. Here, it was undisputed that DRC hired ABM Crane Rental, not Circle T.
In Wheeler, a single direction from Wheeler to Carlson to "make it fit", despite a problem in
installation, was sufficient to show direction on the part of Wheeler, to constitute "retained control".
Id., ^flO. In comparison, Brett Campbell and DRC were micro-managing this "labor-only" contract as
part of the overall construction of the restaurant. Further, the Wheeler court found that, if Wheeler had
agreed to assume the responsibility of installing the exhaust system, it would still be liable for Carlson's
work. Like Wheeler, because DRC actually assumed the responsibility of providing the crane and
operator, DRC should be held liable for the results of that operation.
After Thompson v. Jess, and Local Gov 't Trust v. Wheeler Machinery, 2006 UT App 513,154
P.3d 175 were decided, the Utah Supreme Court applied the "retained control" doctrine in Begaye v.
Big D Construction, 2008 UT 4, 178 P.3d 343. In Begaye, the general contractor, Big D, had hired a
subcontractor to construct a "rebar wall", but did not actually assist in, or supervise, the construction
of that wall. The wall was insufficiently braced, and it collapsed on Begaye, killing him. To make the
Begaye fact setting similar to Magana, imagine that the Big D supervisor had actually assisted in
negligently constructing the rebar wall that fell on Begaye. Imagine that the Begay general contractor
had a supervisor walking the site daily, helping lay out the re-bar walls, helping arrange for delivery of
10

the forms, watching the bracing, discussing the bracing with the subcontractor, and actually helping
construct the improper bracing that allowed the wall to fall. Those facts were missing in Begaye, and
illustrate why Magana falls within the "retained control" exception, and Begaye does not.
CONCLUSION
The Utah Supreme Court has the prerogative to shape the development of common-law tort
rules, such as the "retained control" doctrine. Lower courts function best when a clear line of authority
is laid down by the Supreme Court. The Thompson v. Jess line of authority is critical because of the
dangers posed by construction site accidents, and the complex litigation that results. The Utah Court
of Appeals failed to carefully and properly apply the Thompson v. Jess doctrine of "retained control"
and "active participation". The Court of Appeals conceded that there was evidence that Campbell was
helping rig the load with Circle T. Magana, p. 2. Despite that, the Court of Appeals basically ruled out
the possibility that the general contractor could be negligent for its own conduct in a construction job
in working with a subcontractor. It should have realized that Campbell, at a minimum, retained control
of his part of the decision to rig the wet load, and retained control of what he actually did in helping
with the negligent rigging.
Instead of keeping its eye on Campbell's active participation in personally and jointly rigging,
the Court of Appeals looked away at whether Campbell was telling Alexander what to do on his end
of the load: "There is, however, no evidence to indicate that Campbell exerted control over Alexander,
or Circle T, or any part of the offloading that was taking place." Magana, p. 2. But Campbell was the
person in charge of safety; he had the right and the duty to control the offloading in a safe manner. The
fact that he failed to exercise that control misses the point: he was there and in charge and he should
have exerted control to ensure safety. The Court of Appeals confused the actual exercise of control with
the right to exercise control.
The Court of Appeals fell for the defense tactic of picking individual facts out, and arguing that
these individual facts, standing alone, do not constitute "active participation". Magana believes that the
facts of Campbell's direct participation in the rigging alone does constitute "active participation", but
beyond that, the Court of Appeals refused to let the various individual facts form a mosaic of "active
11

participation". This is shown when it betrayed a hint of annoyance when it noted that Magana had
"woven into their active participation argument" the fact that DRC "allegedly prov ided the crane used
to offload the trusses". Magana, p. 2. This is illustrative of the problem; the Court of Appeals picked
out individual facts to argue that they did not constitute a whole. That misunderstands the nature of the
project in a fact-intensive case like this: Magana was "weaving" individual facts into a "narrative"
which creates a "picture" or "tapestry" of "active participation". It is how a prosecutor builds a
circumstantial case of guilt, fact by fact, inference by inference. While the criminal may argue that each
individual fact does not constitute proof of guilt, the fact-finder may instead weave the circumstantial
evidence in a picture of guilt, or, in this case, "active participation".
There was a material issue of fact whether DRC, through Campbell, rigged one end of the load
that fell on Magana. Further, there was a genuine issue of material fact whether both DRC, through
Campbell, and Circle T, through Alexander, jointly decided to rig a wet load at all. Finally, there was
evidence that DRC actively participated in the preparations for, and execution of the framing, including
off-loading the roof trusses. The Utah Court of Appeals erred. A Writ of Certiorari should issue.
DATED this A H day of November, 2008.

Daniel F. Bertch
Attorney for Petitioners/Appellants
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Before Judges Greenwood, Billings, and Davis.
GREENWOOD, Presiding Judge:
Celso and Yolanda Magana argue that summary judgment was
improper because material issues of fact exist regarding whether
Dave Roth Construction (DRC) actively participated in rigging the
joists or in the overall construction of the project to the
extent that DRC may be liable under the retained control
doctrine. "Summary judgment is proper only when there is no
genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law." Thompson v. Jess, 1999 UT 22,
% 12, 979 P.2d 322 (internal quotation marks omitted). We review
the trial court's decision on "summary judgment for correctness,
according no deference to [its] legal conclusions." Id. "We
view [the] facts and all reasonable inferences in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party." Smith v. Hales & Warner
Constr., Inc., 2005 UT App 38, 1 6, 107 P.3d 701.

"Utah adheres to the general common law rule that 'the
employer of an independent contractor is not liable for physical
harm caused to another by an act or omission of the contractor or
his servants.1" Thompson, 1999 UT 22, % 13 (quoting Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 409 (1965)). There is, however, an exception
to this rule, commonly referred to as the retained control
doctrine. See id. f 14. Under this doctrine, "a principal
employer is subject to liability for injuries arising out of its
independent contractor's work if the employer is actively
involved in, or asserts control over, the manner of performance
of the contracted work." Id. % 19 (emphasis added). The
retained control doctrine "provides a 'narrow theory of liability
applicable in the unique circumstance where an employer of an
independent contractor exercises enough control over the
contracted work to give rise to a limited duty of care.'" Begaye
v. Big D. Constr. Corp., 2008 UT 4, % 8, 178 P.3d 343 (quoting
Thompson, 1999 UT 22, 1 15).
The Maganas first argue that Mr. Magana's conflicting
testimony about Brett Campbell taking part in rigging the joists
creates a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether DRC
actively exercised control over offloading the roof trusses. We
are not, however, persuaded by this argument because mere
participation does not expose DRC to liability. In Begaye v. Big
D. Construction Corp., 2008 UT 4, 178 P.3d 343, the supreme court
explained that liability under the "active participation"
standard of the retained control doctrine is appropriate only
"'when the principal employer directs that the contracted work be
done by use of a certain mode or otherwise interferes with the
means and methods by which the work is to be accomplished.'" Id.
1 9 (quoting Thompson, 1999 UT 22, 1 19). In other words, DRC
must have "exercis[ed] 'such control over the means utilized that
the contractor [could not] carry out the injury-causing aspect of
the work in his or her own way.'" Id. % 10 (quoting Thompson,
1999 UT 22, i| 21) . Viewing the facts in the light most favorable
to the Maganas, at best, they indicate that Campbell may have
been on the semi-truck, assisting Ted Alexander with rigging the
second load of roof trusses. There is, however, no evidence to
indicate that Campbell exerted control over Alexander, or Circle
T, or any part of the offloading that was taking place. Thus,
DRC cannot be liable under the active participation standard of
the retained control doctrine.
Woven into their active participation argument, the Maganas
briefly assert that DRC is liable because it allegedly provided
the crane used to offload the trusses. While the supreme court,
in Thompson v. Jess, 1999 UT 22, 979 P.2d 322, stated that
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[t]he degree of control necessary for the creation of a legal
duty must involve either the direct management of the means and
methods of the independent contractor's activities or the
provision of the specific equipment that caused the injury, ' f! id.
U 20 (emphasis added) (quoting Grahn v. Tosco Corp., 68 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 806, 820 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997), overruled in part by
Hooker v. Department of Transp., 38 P.3d 1081, 1091 (Cal. 2002);
Camarao v. Tiaarda Dairy, 25 P.3d 1096, 1102 (Cal. 2001)), this
statement derives from a California decision explaining that
liability may be imposed under the retained control doctrine
"where the [employer] furnished the equipment or was obligated by
contract to do so, and the equipment proved to be defective,
causing injury to the employee of the independent contractor."
McDonald v. Shell Oil Co., 285 P.2d 902, 905 (Cal. 1955).
Because the Maganas have not alleged that DRC provided defective
equipment that caused Mr. Magana's injury, the Maganas' theory
under this aspect of the retained control doctrine also fails.
The Maganas next argue that DRC is liable under the retained
control doctrine because Campbell was responsible, in part, for
the overall safety of the project. However, our supreme court
has expressly cautioned against imposing liability under these
circumstances. In Beaaye, the court noted that
there are serious public policy concerns in
holding a general contractor liable for
injuries of a subcontractor simply because it
has a supervisory role and has closely
monitored safety on the job site as a
responsible general contractor should.
"Penalizing a general contractor's efforts to
promote safety and coordinate a general
safety program among various independent
contractors at a large jobsite hardly serves
to advance the goal of work site safety."
2008 UT 4, H 11 n.4 (quoting Martens v. MCL Constr. Corp., 807
N.E.2d 480, 490 (111. App. Ct. 2004)); see also McDonald, 285
P.2d at 904. Therefore, liability may not be asserted on the
basis that DRC may have maintained a general responsibility over
project safety.
We reach the same conclusion with regard to the Maganas'
argument that DRC is liable under the retained control doctrine
because it directed, to some extent, the construction of the
walls. In Thompson, the supreme court explained that there is a
distinction between control over how the work is done and

20070548-CA

3

"control over the desired result." 1999 UT 22, % 24; see also
Smith v. Hales & Warner Constr., Inc., 2005 UT App 38, % 13, 107
P.3d 701. Specifically, the Thompson court declined to impose
liability under the retained control doctrine even though the
homeowner directed where the injury causing activity would take
place because the homeowner was merely exerting control over the
desired result, not the manner in which the work was done. See
1999 UT 22, fU 3-4, 26. Like the homeowner in Thompson, when
Campbell "snapped the lines for the walls," he was merely
exercising some control over the desired result, i.e., where the
walls were to be constructed in accordance with the plans for the
project. This action does not amount to control over the manner
in which the work was done, and thus, liability under this theory
cannot result.
In their last effort to create liability under the retained
control doctrine, the Maganas rely on this court's decision in
Local Government Trust v. Wheeler Machinery Co., 2006 UT App 513,
154 P.3d 175. Briefly addressing the retained control doctrine,
the Wheeler court reversed summary judgment, concluding that
"there is sufficient evidence to create a question as to the
applicability of the retained control doctrine" because "an
invoice suggests that Wheeler's agents gave verbal approval for
[the subcontractor's] work," and there was some evidence that the
direction to adjust the injury-causing equipment came from
Wheeler, "strongly suggest [ing] that Wheeler was directing [the
subcontractor's] actions." Id. f 10. There is, however, no
similar evidence advanced in this case suggesting that DRC
controlled, or even influenced, the manner in which the work was
done. Mr. Magana's inconsistent testimony suggests that Campbell
may have assisted Alexander, who was in charge of offloading the
trusses; but there is no testimony suggesting that Campbell
ordered Alexander to offload the trusses in a certain way. Thus,
the Wheeler decision does not require us to reverse the trial
court's summary judgment ruling.
Finally, the Maganas argue that DRC is liable under sections
413, 416, and 427 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Yet, the
Utah Supreme Court unequivocally rejected this same argument in
Thompson, stating, "Whether based on direct negligence under
section 413 or vicarious liability under sections 416 and 427,
these provisions have no application when the injured person is
an employee of the independent contractor undertaking the
allegedly dangerous work." Id. % 30 (emphasis added). It is
undisputed that Mr. Magana was employed by Circle T, the company
responsible for the framing and the roof trusses. Mr. Magana was
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not employed by DRC.
not apply here.1

Consequently, these Restatement sections do

Based on the foregoing, we affirm.

Pamela T. Greenwood,
Presiding Judge

WE CONCUR:

Judith M. Billings, Judge

James Z. Davis, Judge

1. We decline to rule on the Maganas' remaining arguments--that
DRC is liable under Restatement sections 323, 324, and 424, or
under a theory of agency--because these arguments are not
adequately briefed and the trial court did not address them. In
their appellate brief, the Maganas cite to the Restatement
provisions and make a general, unsupported assertion that agency
law applies. They do not, however, provide any additional legal
argument or authority. Thus, their arguments have not been
properly presented to this court. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a);
State v. Gomez, 2002 UT 120, % 20, 63 P.3d 72 ("[A] reviewing
court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with
pertinent authority cited and is not simply a depository in which
the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and
research." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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